

**Knowledge
for Change**

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Migration and Mobility: European Dilemmas

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1. The Blurring Distinction Between Mobility and Migration

Human beings are migratory animals, just like many other species. Unlike with some birds, however, their migration patterns are not primarily seasonal – over the long course of early human history, they have mostly migrated in order to populate new habitats. The agrarian revolution of the Neolithic age transformed nomadic migration patterns of hunters and gatherers within a habitat into sedentary economies and lifestyles. More or less simultaneously the first cities were created as centres of power from where larger political territories could be ruled. The triple inventions of agriculture, of the city and of political territory with more or less fixed borders changed not only the patterns of geographical movements, but also the way these movements were perceived. Henceforth, it became possible to distinguish migrants who cross a political border from natives who have either a stable residence inside the territory or whose movement is confined within it.

There are thus two different ways of looking at human movement: as physical relocation, which can be described and measured by parameters of space and time, and as the crossing of political borders, which can be described and measured only by assuming that these borders are relatively stable over time and that they contain a relatively stable population within them. Let's call the first description of movement mobility and the second one migration. This distinction did probably not matter much until fairly recently. As long as states did not have the power and ambition to control migration at their borders and to unleash mobility within them, any unknown person turning up in a village square was a stranger, no matter whether she was from another continent or another village across the mountains.

It was the European conquest of most of the rest of the world and the European invention of an international state system that made the distinction between mobility and migration fundamentally important. As the background for migration, this system is based on a few basic assumptions and norms: (1) Each piece of land and coastal water belongs to one state and one state only and state borders are relatively stable and mutually recognized between states; (2) Humanity is categorized by nationality so that every human being belongs to one state; (3) States are territorially sovereign: their borders do not only demarcate their jurisdiction but are also sites where they can legitimately control migration.

These assumptions are not perfectly met and imperfection leaves room for variation and change. There is Antarctica which still has not been fully divided up between states. In the 20th century state borders have changed quite often due to wars, the disintegration of empires, and secessions. Human beings are not as neatly sorted into

states as territory is: there are persistently high numbers of stateless people and a rapidly growing number of multiple nationals. Most states have subscribed to the human rights conventions and have thereby signed away their right to control outmigration, which used to be their main concern until the 19th century, as well as the right to expel their surplus populations, criminals and dissenters. All they can claim now is the right to control immigration of non-citizens.

Yet the assumptions still remain powerful in shaping our perception of migration and the political instruments for regulating it. They underpin also a set of individual and state rights that are spelled out in international law: (1) Everybody has the right to move freely within a state territory and to leave that territory; (2) Every citizen has the right to return and every state has the duty to readmit its nationals; (3) Every state has the right to decide whether to admit non-citizens to its territory, to determine the conditions for their stay and to determine under its own laws who are its nationals.

I suggest that we may be approaching a threshold where this old way of distinguishing mobility from migration and governing the latter might become unsustainable. And Europe is, once again, the historical laboratory where this change becomes visible in the most dramatic way.

A first observation that points to this conclusion is the increasing discrepancy between migration and mobility in sheer statistical terms. Statistics of international migration count the numbers of persons who have resided in a country other than their state of birth for more than 12 months. With 3.4%, the share of international migrants in the world population, as calculated by the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, is surprisingly low and stable over time.ⁱ This figure is nearly the same as in 1900, although due to general population growth the absolute number of 258 million international migrants is much larger now. These numbers underestimate the phenomenon of global migration systematically because of the assumptions generated by the international state system. They do not include temporary and circular migrants who stay abroad for less than one year and they exclude those who return to their country of origin, because these people are regarded as exercising mobility rather than engaging in migration.

Compare this now with international tourist arrivals, which have grown continuously, year by year, from 25 million in 1950 to 1.3 billion in 2017.ⁱⁱ International tourists cross state borders, but they are not perceived as migrants because they visit other societies without taking up residence or work. While crossing a border changes the social and legal status of migrants and the composition of sending and receiving states, international tourism is a form of mobility that floats on the surface of societies, so to speak, without triggering demographic change. Yet tourism does have an indirect impact on states' capacity to control migration. Building walls and mobilizing armies at the border in order to deter irregular migrants does not help to curb the increasing numbers of people who enter states at airports, harbours and border crossing points with tourist visas and who subsequently overstay.

Consider also the rise of other forms of international movement that do not match the standard types of labour migration, family reunification and refugee flows, such as international student exchange programmes or intra-company transfers, both of which have increased steeply. These are not unregulated forms of mobility but they are largely self-regulated by non-state actors when it comes to selecting migrants.

There are still other channels for human movement that blur the distinction between mobility and migration even more strongly. I have already mentioned the growing number of multiple citizens. This trend has three drivers: (1) the international norm that every state can determine its own nationals, which means that *ius sanguinis* laws in a country of origin and *ius soli* laws in a country of settlement produce second generation children with multiple nationality; (2) norms of gender equality in human rights conventions, which have meant that wives no longer automatically acquire their husbands' nationality and that children can inherit their mother's as well as their father's citizenship; (3) a fundamental change in political attitude of source countries towards their "diasporas", which they used to regard as lost populations and now mostly see as an economic, cultural and political resource. As a result, emigrants are now allowed to retain their original nationality when adopting that of their host countries in 58% out of a global sample of 17 states. Conversely, 64% of these states have dropped a requirement that applicants must renounce their previous nationality.ⁱⁱⁱ The effect of this global trend is to transform much migration into mobility, since multiple nationals enjoy unconditional admission rights in several countries and can move between them just as internal migrants within a state territory do. This mobility effect of multiple citizenship is also a main reason why the increasing supply has been met by even greater demand. It is not only already settled international migrants who want dual citizenship so that they can move between their states of birth and long-term residence. Millions of people in South America with European ancestry can apply for Italian or Spanish passports that give them access to all EU member states.^{iv} There is also a booming global business of selling passports with high mobility value to investors. States that offer citizenship for cash or investment usually do not require that their newly minted citizens must take up residence.^v

A final form of international mobility that I want to highlight is the emergence of regional free movement regimes created by states granting each other's nationals not only visa free entry but also access to long-term residence and employment. The best-known free movement regime of this kind is of course the European Union. It has established its own supranational citizenship whose core is a right of free movement throughout the Union's territory and of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. The EU has the most advanced regional free movement regime, but there have been smaller-scale and earlier experiments, such as the Common Travel Area between the UK and Ireland, the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand, and the Nordic Passport Union. Moreover, there are similar agreements today

between the MERCOSUR states in South America and the ECOWAS states in Western Africa that also aspire to create seamless areas of free movement.

Such reciprocity-based regional agreements on free movement have large spill-over effects for the governance of international migration. For the sake of removing obstacles to free movement of persons and goods, the members of the Schengen Agreement have committed to abolishing border controls within the Schengen area (with temporary exceptions in case of public security threats and emergencies), which allows also third country nationals with a Schengen visa to travel freely within a large geographic area. Open internal borders did not only push EU member states towards joint control of external borders, they also meant that hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers arriving in the summer of 2015 had not only entered Greek but also EU territory and consequently headed north to their destinations in Austria, Germany and Sweden.

The logic of joint control of external borders, open internal borders and the Common European Asylum System clashed head on with the principle of the Dublin Regulation that the first European country of asylum is responsible not merely for examining asylum claims but also for hosting refugees permanently. Attempts by the EU institutions to resolve the contradiction through mandatory refugee relocation schemes have failed miserably. Equally significant, the gradual enlargement of the EU has meant that large groups of international migrants from candidate states for EU accession were suddenly transformed from third country nationals into mobile EU citizens, even if some member states restricted their access to the labour market during lengthy transition periods.

Also in terms of integration policies, the distinction between mobile citizens and migrants has become increasingly problematic and blurred in the European Union. While third country nationals have become target groups for mandatory integration programmes, there are no publicly funded integration measures for mobile EU citizens who face many of the same cultural and social adaptation problems as other migrants. At the same time, anti-immigrant political campaigns often treat mobile EU citizens not as free movers but as undesirable foreign migrants, as the Brexit campaign and attacks on Roma in many EU countries have illustrated.

The result of all these phenomena is what we may call a migration-mobility paradox: The modern state system has been designed to distinguish between migration and mobility, but current developments have eroded its capacity to uphold this distinction. This is a paradox insofar as some basic norms of the system, such as sovereign self-determination in matters of nationality, have contributed to this erosion, while other drivers, such as the steeply declining costs of international travel, have driven up the volume of international mobility to levels where it jeopardizes state capacities to control territorial admissions.

States are trying to respond by moving the sites of migration control away from their geographical borders. The US has established a 100 miles zone where border patrols

can set up immigration checkpoints. This area includes 9 of the 10 largest metropolitan areas in the country. Australia has gone furthest by legally “excising” the whole of Australian territory from its “migration zone” in 2012, which means that nobody can apply for a visa or asylum upon arrival anywhere in the Australian mainland or its offshore territories. Borders are not only folded into the territory, they are also propelled outwards through “remote control” policies ranging from passenger screening by airlines to paying countries of departure for stopping international migrants at points of embarkation and running joint operations to catch boat people before they reach their destinations. The effect is that, in spite of the highly visible fortification of land borders through walls and fences, borders as demarcation of jurisdictions no longer match borders as sites of control. The latter have been transformed from lines into shape-shifting zones where rights of non-citizens are in jeopardy.

Another way in which states respond to the dilemma is by investing heavily into new technology that allows them to identify migrants (e.g. through face recognition) and to track their movements (e.g. through infrared cameras and mobile phone data). The use of many of these technologies is not limited to migration control. They originate often in military purposes (such as geo-positioning systems) or in data mining technologies promoted by internet corporations. And they spill over into new forms of social and state control affecting not only migrants but general populations as well. The effect is that states regain some of their lost capacity to control migration, but this comes at the expense of making mobility less free for everybody, even those who enjoy free movement rights.

2. Europe’s African migration dilemma

In a recent controversial book, the demographer Stephen Smith tells a frightening story.^{vi} As we all know, Europe is a rapidly ageing continent whose population would shrink without immigration and whose comparatively generous welfare states are under stress because of a rapidly rising dependency ratio between working age populations and the elderly who live on pensions. By contrast, Africa is experiencing fast population growth and a “youth bulge” with 40% of the population below age 15.

Young people in sub-Saharan Africa see Europe as a migration destination for four reasons: First, they have, in Smith’s words, a “vision of the world” – they have mobile phones and sufficient information about better conditions for life in Europe as well as about ways to get there. Second, as a result of previous migration, there are growing African diasporas in European countries that provide information and support for newcomers, so that migration becomes a self-reinforcing process. Third, as migration researchers know well, the most deprived populations lack the means for long-distance migration, but young Africans increasingly seem to find the money required to pay smugglers and traffickers to take them to Europe, which may be due to pooling

of resources within families that expect to better their lives through remittances, or also to a slow onset of economic development that enables some to be sufficiently mobile to try to escape from poverty. Fourth, Africans have already become internally mobile by leaving rural backwaters and moving into rapidly growing mega-cities. Young people are often risk-takers who move not only when they know that this will improve their lives, but also when they see a chance to leave behind conditions where their ambitions will be thwarted. So it is no surprise that many embark on risky and even life-threatening trips to Europe.

Optimists may think that there are benefits for both sides since Europe needs a young labour force. However, it is not at all clear that European economies have sufficient numbers of jobs to offer. Optimists will also point out that remittances can contribute to economic development in Africa that will eventually allow people to stay. Yet the remittances will flow only if migrants do find jobs.

Smith's extrapolations are strongly disputed by other scholars. Poverty has kept international migration in Africa lower than in other continents and authoritarian regimes there try to control immigration as well as outmigration. There is more intracontinental migration than outmigration to Europe and elsewhere. Yet the trend points towards increasing migration towards Europe and diversification of countries of origin and destination beyond the old colonial links. And the migration transition hypothesis suggests that the very onset of economic development is likely to provide more people with resources for leaving before it provides them with sufficient incentives and opportunities for staying.^{vii}

The drivers of future migration from Africa to Europe are thus not difficult to identify: (1) Fertility rates decline in most world regions except for Africa; (2) Globalization shrinks the world by reducing distances for movement; (3) It narrows somewhat economic inequality between countries while at the same time increasing inequality within countries^{viii}, providing more people in poorer countries with an acute sense of relative deprivation and potential opportunities.

In a world of open borders, these three conditions would inevitably generate very large flows. Yet we do not live in such a world. States still try to control immigration and have powerful regulatory tools in their hands. Future migration to Europe is therefore not determined by some iron law of demographics or economics that disparities in fertility and wealth will be evened out through migration flows. Migration *policies* matter and what policies will be adopted depends on the *politics* of migration in Europe.

There are thus two kinds of migration dilemmas. The first is about which migration policies to choose and the second is about whether the right kind of policy can be adopted and implemented given the increasingly deep political divisions running through European societies. The first dilemma is essentially an ethical one, the second is a political one.

The ethical dilemma is usually framed as one between open borders and sovereignty of states in migration control. I suggest that we need to overcome this view. It is not at all clear that open borders for immigration would contribute to global social justice instead of further enhancing social inequality within both societies of origin and destination. And, as I claimed above, sovereign self-determination over migration control is increasingly a fantasy because European states themselves have created multiple channels for freedom of movement.

Moreover, the two sides of this dilemma can actually be bridged if we do not see free movement as an *instrument* for flattening economic and demographic disparities between countries, but regard instead the flattening of such disparities as a *precondition* for expanding freedom of movement.^{ix} Those who value both global social justice and freedom of movement should promote economic development, lower fertility rates and democratic stability in Africa, which would create the conditions for relaxing immigration control and expanding channels for mobility between the continents. Migration is not the answer, but it can contribute to both goals if it is regulated in the right way.

I don't know what the right principles and tools for policies of economic development, demographic stabilization and democratic consolidation are that European states should adopt in their relations with African societies. But I have some ideas about what the right ethical principles for European migration policies are.

The first one is to distinguish between different admission claims. Opportunity-seeking migrants are different from refugees seeking protection and from those seeking to be reunited with their family members. Of course, one and the same person may have all three motives. A refugee will naturally seek protection in a country where she will also enjoy opportunities to rebuild her life and where family members of hers have settled previously. But my point is that the moral claims to be admitted that the three types of migrants have are fundamentally different and should result in different admission channels. This becomes obvious once we adopt an international perspective and ask: Which state has a duty to admit whom?

Consider first family reunification: Family members have a human right to be reunited, but the anchor person who has been admitted previously has a more specific right to family reunification in *this* country rather than in the country of origin. Family migration is thus essentially a membership-based claim towards particular countries. Refugees have a claim to protection of their fundamental rights, but they do not have to prove a prior connection to the country of destination where they claim asylum. Where there are special connections, because of prior migration flows, historical ties, involvement of outside countries in the violence triggering a refugee crisis, or because of mere geographic proximity, these states will have stronger responsibilities than others. But generally, providing asylum is a duty of *all* states and the burdens of refugee protection must therefore be distributed fairly and widely across them.^x

But do states also have duties to admit economic migrants? I suggest that they do if admission generates a “triple win”, that is, if it creates benefits for the migrant, the country of origin and the receiving country. For some, such a principle may seem too weak. It is a minimalist principle that migration should be admitted if everyone would be better off as a result. Why should we strive only for pareto optimal improvement rather than for fair sharing of the benefits between the three categories of agents involved? One reason is that it seems hard to say what the standards of fairness would be in this case. Since we are considering migration between independent countries, there are also no institutions that could guarantee a fair redistribution of benefits. Others may doubt that a principle of mutual benefit creates any moral obligations. Individuals are generally free to pursue or not to pursue their own interests, why should this be different for states? Or, to put it the other way round, if some migration creates benefits for all, why should it only be permitted instead of enforced?^{xi} The consequentialist logic of mutual benefit must for these reasons be tempered with commitments to migrants’ individual autonomy, on the one hand, and duties of states to engage in mutually beneficial interactions, on the other hand.

Some may, however, regard a triple win principle as too demanding. It does indeed rule out most of the current economic immigration policies in the North that aim to skim off skilled immigrants, shifting the costs of education and training to countries of origin and without taking into account brain drain effects. Yet it also rules out considering economic migration primarily as an instrument of international poverty relief. Political philosopher Robert Goodin suggested such an approach in 1992: "If we cannot move enough money to where the needy people are, then we will have to count on moving as many of the needy people as possible to where the money is."^{xii} Such a policy might not only be inefficient in alleviating poverty in countries of origin, it would also conflict with requirements of democratic legitimacy in receiving states, whose governments have a special responsibility to promote social justice domestically, just as the governments of sending states do. Finally, the triple win principle rules out exploiting migrants for the sake of greater benefits of either source or destination countries. It would not allow for temporary migration policies that keep migrants dependent on employers and deny them prospects of secure residence, equal rights and eventually access to citizenship.

The triple win principle provides thus a critical standard for current economic migration policies. But it does not support a policy of free movement for economic migrants. In order to meet the standard, migrants will have to be selected and managed by states. And in order to prevent that economic migration programmes are dominated by the interests of wealthy receiving countries, they should be managed jointly by sending and receiving states together with organisations representing the interests of migrants vis-à-vis both. The principle supports thus calls for international and global governance of migration.^{xiii} Although it aims at benefits for all involved, this goal cannot be realistically achieved by states acting in pursuit of their self-interest without having to take the other affected interests into account.

In contrast with family reunification or asylum, economic migrants do not have individual claims for admission. States have to run programmes that offer migration opportunities to sufficient numbers and the procedures for selecting individuals must be transparent and non-discriminatory. But would-be migrants who are not admitted under such conditions cannot complain that their rights have been violated.

How would these principles apply to migration from Africa to Europe? They would entail opening up sufficiently wide channels for regular economic migration. These should have the effect of curbing somewhat the demand for trafficking and of unclogging asylum systems by creating alternative channels for admission. The triple win condition would, however, keep the numbers that European states have duties to admit far below the numbers of those who are capable and motivated to move. Moreover, the absence of individual admission claims in such programs means that those who do not get a place in an economic migration quota cannot claim that their rights have been violated. What will then be the effect of frustrated migration hopes? Certainly not worse than the devastating impact of current European policies of fighting irregular migration from Africa. A lot of pressure is going to remain. But potentially, the incentives provided by a well-designed economic migration programme could even be beneficial for those who are not admitted if they develop their skills to improve their migration prospects and employ them subsequently in their countries of origin.

3. Europe's migration politics dilemma

When looking around for countries whose migration policies approximate the ethical goals outlined so far, Sweden has in the past often been identified as a best case. It was a champion of free movement in the European Union and the only pre-2004 member state that kept its labour market open in all three rounds of enlargement (in 2004, 2007 and 2013). Sweden has admitted significant numbers of economic migrants as well as larger percentages of refugees than other European states. In 1975 Sweden pioneered a policy of granting all long-term resident migrants access to secure residence, social rights, local voting rights and citizenship. Today, it still remains among the very few countries that have not introduced language skills and economic self-sufficiency requirements for naturalisation. Yet, in 2015 Sweden followed other destination states of refugees by introducing border controls. And in 2018 the far right and anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats attracted 17.5% in the general election. We might say that Sweden exemplifies the difficulty of translating ethical migration policies into democratic politics. How can we make sense of this political conundrum?

Normative theorists have discussed the dilemma that global justice requires open borders while democracy requires immigration control since the 1980s. In summer 2015 this philosophical problem was enacted as a political drama on the European stage. When the German and Swedish governments decided not to implement the

Dublin Regulation by pushing back refugees at their borders towards states of transit and first entry, they responded to a widespread view also among their citizens that admitting these people was first of all a humanitarian duty. Chancellor Merkel's policy has often been driven by reading public opinion and her much-criticized statement: "Wir schaffen das!" ("we can handle this") was no exception.

The humanitarian framing of the issue was, however, eventually defeated in the public debate by an alternative view that this was a security and a membership question, and more specifically an issue of cultural belonging rather than primarily of limited resources for social and economic integration. The refugees from war zones in Syria and Afghanistan were going to stay and if borders remained open for further inflows, host societies would no longer be able to cope. In Germany, the turning point was New Year's Eve in Cologne when young North Africans mobbed together and sexually harassed German women.

The new framing of refugee admission as a security and cultural and membership issue gave the upper hand to those political forces that had already framed all kinds of immigration in this way for a long time. And under increasing pressure from populist challenger parties, centrist governments in Austria, Germany and Sweden quickly agreed that they had to regain control over immigration from the Middle East and Africa.

The political earthquakes that triggered this policy shift buried under the rubble also those rational as well as ethical policies that had previously been at least on the European agenda, even if the proposals and initial decisions had been deficient in many respects. These included complementing the Common European Asylum System with a mandatory scheme of responsibility sharing for refugee protection among EU Member States, and intentions to open new channels for regular economic migration from sub-Saharan countries.

The advocates of restoring state sovereignty won this political battle partly because the other side lacked a coherent political vision beyond the humanitarian response that would address the membership question and promote different channels for regular and controlled migration. Eventually, the sovereigntists could even claim the moral high ground for themselves by arguing that no-entry policies and turn-backs to Libyan detention centres would save lives by deterring African migrants from risking to cross the Mediterranean.

Since the 1990s Europe's free movement regime had spilled over into migration control by pushing Member States towards harmonization and eventually joint external border controls as well as European standards on asylum, family reunification and the rights and legal status of long-term resident third country nationals. Now the capture of public opinion and the political agenda by sovereigntists has led to a backlash against free movement with border controls inside the Schengen area being maintained without any evidence of current public order threats that could justify them. Because of the previous blurring of the distinction between migration and mobility, it turns out

now that one cannot reassert national control over immigration without also restricting mobility in the EU.

The political ideology driving the Trump administration's foreign and trade policy, the Brexiteers' gamble, and continental European border closures pursues always the same goal: The nation-state must "take back control" that it has lost due to globalization. It must take back control *over* immigration as well as *from* international and supranational institutions. This aim may be a chimera but chasing the chimera can severely set back efforts to find cooperative solutions to global problems such as climate change, the emergence of global monopolies in the digital economy or international migration and refugee protection.

But how did Europe get into a situation where rational and ethical migration policies are increasingly hard to defend publicly and where centrist parties feel they have to pander to the rhetoric of closure to prevent a further drift of their electorate towards the populist right – and in some countries also the populist left – of the political spectrum? One answer suggested by political scientists studying public opinion and electoral behaviour is that the old left-right axis along which voters and parties have aligned for more than two centuries no longer fully structures the political space. There is a new cleavage between citizens whose political values focus on how open or closed societies should be. Attitudes become then polarized on issues of globalization, European integration, international governance, and migration and parties that represent the opposite poles of this new axis can successfully compete with centrist parties that are aligned on the left-right axis but find it difficult to take a clear position on the open-closed issues.

The voters attracted by cosmopolitan or nationalist values have different social profiles, with the former being younger and better educated while the latter tend to be older and with lower educational levels. The sheer demographic weight of old voters in Europe's societies gives nationalist positions potentially more clout. If the new cleavage were only about class and demography, there might still be ways to bridge it in similar ways as the divides between left and right have been bridged in the past – through proportional representation systems, through grand coalition governments, and through cooperation between political elites that had vested interests in stable institutions.

These traditional solutions are premised on the idea that differences of class and political values are contained and can be managed within a political space that is shared by all citizens. The problem is that the new cleavage focuses on different visions of the political community and is also associated with personal experiences of mobility. Those advocating more open societies often regard Europe or the wider world as their natural space of opportunities and they often have experiences of not just travelling, but also studying or working within this space. Those who want the nation-state to take back control experience mobility beyond the national borders not as an opportunity but as a threat to their values and ways of life.

If there is no common vision of the political space within which political cleavages can be institutionally mediated and bridged, what hope is left for a democratic consensus on migration policies, which most strongly articulate and polarize the two views? It is almost as if the two sides did not only live in different political spaces but also had different views of the world that we all share. For one side, it still consists of sovereign nation-states that compete with each other externally and represent internally clearly defined nations that must remain in control over newcomers in order to retain their distinct identity. For the other side, states are just one level of democratic government and they have become too interdependent and small to resolve many of the most urgent global problems. They thus need to be complemented with global governance regimes and supranational institutions at the regional level and should also transfer powers to local governments that are better equipped to manage social integration in highly mobile and superdiverse societies.

You may have guessed that the latter is also my own vision of the world. Yet, as a democrat I also believe that it cannot be imposed by enlightened elites on those who do not share it. It must instead be fought and argued for in political arenas. This is where the task of academic reflection ends and that of democratic politics begin. ^{xiv}

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- ⁱ See <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/international-migration-report-2017.html>
- ⁱⁱ WTO: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262750/number-of-international-tourist-arrivals-worldwide/>
- ⁱⁱⁱ How Citizenship Laws Differ: A Global Comparison, Delmi-Globalcit policy brief, Nov 2018, http://globalcit.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Policy_Brief_Delmi_GLOBALCIT.pdf
- ^{iv} Harpaz, Y. (2015). "Ancestry into Opportunity: How Global Inequality Drives Demand for Non-Resident European Union Citizenship." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(13): 2081-2104.
- ^v Džankić, J. (2018). "Immigrant investor programmes in the European Union (EU)." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 26(1): 64-80.
- ^{vi} Stephen Smith (2018) *La ruée vers l'Europe. La jeune Afrique en route pour le Veux Continent*, Grasset, Paris.
- ^{vii} See Flahaux, M.-L. and H. De Haas (2016). "African migration: trends, patterns, drivers." *Comparative Migration Studies* 4(1): 1-25; Héran, François (2018) "Europe and the Spectre of Sub-Saharan Migration." *Population & Societies*, Nr. 558: 1-4.
- ^{viii} Branko Milanovic (2016) *Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization*
- ^{ix} Bauböck, R. (2009). "Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic Citizenship." *European Journal of Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie* 50(1): 1-31.
- ^x Owen, D. (2016). *In Loco Civitatis: On the Normative Basis of the Institution of Refugeehood and Responsibility for Refugees.* *Migration in Political Theory*. S. Fine and L. Ypi. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 269-289; Bauböck, R. (2018). "Refugee Protection and Burden-sharing in the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 141-156.
- ^{xi} Angeli, O. (2018). *Migration und Demokratie. Ein Spannungsverhältnis*. Dietzingen, Reclam, p. 39.
- ^{xii} If people were money..., in: Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (eds.) (1992) *Free Movement. Ethical Issues in the transnational migration of people and of money*. The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania: 6-21, at p. 8.
- ^{xiii} The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted by the UN conference in Marrakesh on 11 December 2018 does not create any new obligations for states, but articulates for the first time such a commitment at a global level.

